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6 Critical composition
of public values
On the enactment and disarticulation
of what counts in health-care markets
Teun Zuiderent-Jerak, Kor Grit, and Tom van der Grinten
Deﬁning or composing public values–The case
of health-care Markets
Within the emerging ﬁeld of valuation studies, the question on how to care for
values that are classiﬁed as ‘public’ is a key concern. This concern stems from a
differentiation within the policy sciences between ‘societal’ and ‘public’ values:
societal values are those that are desirable for society as a whole, whereas those
values become ‘public’ if governments needs to intervene to ensure them (van
der Grinten 2006). Public values thereby become not merely an important
discursive achievement that allows governments to distinguish the values they
need to ensure and the ones they can leave alone; they also present politicians
with the pertinent problem what their ‘intervention’ might consist of.
In recent years, such intervention has increasingly taken the form of
deﬁning what values are public. This would sufﬁce since, according to policy
theory and practice, though government has a mandate to classify values as
‘public’, the actual work of ensuring public values can be delegated to other
parties (WRR 2000). This is how market arrangements entered the scene of
ensuring public values: they are seen as an efﬁcient way to do so, since they
require minimal state intervention. Positioning markets as a solution to the
problem of caring for public values matched developments such as the rise
of new public management (Pollit and Bouckaert 2000). A clear deﬁnition of
public values by governments was however seen as vital for making this
strategy work, as only then can market actors be expected to implement
them properly.
The idea of deploying markets to ensure public values is far from undis-
puted. One of the most heated debates in this regard is on the role of markets
when ensuring public values in health care. Every so often, the introduction of
market mechanisms in health-care regulation leads to warnings that health-care
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markets are an oxymoron (Godlee 2012; Palm 2005). But regardless of such
critique, health economists’ persistent claim that regulated competition can be
used to implement public values, has been attractive to policymakers at least
since the 1980s (Ashmore et al. 1989). Ever since, they have focused many of
their efforts on ascertaining public values through the development of ‘regulated’
or ‘managed competition’ in health care (Enthoven 1988; Enthoven and van de
Ven 2007).
In spite of their differences, the critics and the proponents of health-care
markets share the assumption that, once deﬁned, values remain static in the
implementation process. However, as scholars from social studies of markets
have shown, this is far from the case. Repeated studies have indicated that the
development of market instruments actively shape the very values they were
supposed to implement (Callon et al. 2007; MacKenzie and Millo 2003;
MacKenzie et al. 2007; Sjögren and Helgesson 2007; Zuiderent-Jerak and
van der Grinten 2009). Therefore, various authors have proposed a shift
from the unambiguous deﬁnition of public values that can be ensured through
delegation to market actors to a focus on the composition of public values in
governance arrangements that are deployed to ensure and shape them in
practice (Callon 1987; Latour 2007; Zuiderent-Jerak and van der Grinten
2009). As Bruno Latour has pointed out in his Attempt at a ‘Compositionist
Manifesto’, the word composition ‘underlines that things have to be put
together (Latin componere) while retaining their heterogeneity’ (2010:
473–4). Public values are not therefore to be deﬁned outside of the practices
they are supposed to govern, but are assembled within them; they are imma-
nent rather than transcendent. According to Latour, composition is therefore
the opposite of critique. The main problem he sees with critique is that it is
‘predicated on the discovery of a true world of realities lying behind a veil of
appearances’ (Latour 2004: 274–5). Composition, according to Latour, rejects
such claims to deeper empirical truths as much as it rejects postmodernist
rejections of empiricism:
[C]ompositionists want immanence and truth together . . . [N]othing is beyond
dispute. And yet, closure has to be achieved. But it is achieved only by the slow
process of composition and compromise, not by the revelation of the world of
beyond (Latour 2004: 478, emphasis in the original).
Consequently, the problem that compositionists have with markets for
domains such as health care is not that marketization violates the complexity
of practice by reducing it to quantiﬁed outcomes, as is often proposed by
economic anthropologists (e.g. Miller 2002) and some authors within science
and technology studies (STS) (Mol 2008). Rather, the issue is that within the
present policy practice, the instruments for shaping these values in action are
highly limited. This problem emerges since, as Bruno Latour and Vincent
Lépinay have argued, both economists and economic anthropologists tend
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‘not [to] sufﬁciently quantify all of the values to which they have access’
(Latour and Lépinay 2009, emphasis in the original). The privileged status
that economics grant to ﬁnancial measurement of values leaves other values
insufﬁciently quantiﬁed so that they cannot be brought into the equation of
what counts.
The reasons for the preference for using ﬁnancial market devices are, to
some extent, obvious since, as Gabriel Tarde pointed out, they have one crucial
advantage over many other possible quantiﬁcations: ‘wealth is something
much simpler and more easily measured; for it comprises inﬁnite degrees
and very few different types’ (Tarde 1902, as cited in Latour and Lépinay 2009:
14). To counteract this tendency, Latour and Lépinay (2009) propose that
economics focuses on the inter-comparison of a much broader spectrum of
values, for which it needs to develop a much wider range of ‘valuemeters’.
In the context of debates on health-care markets, this advice however seems
quite similar to long-standing health economic initiatives to develop instru-
ments for example to measure Quality Adjusted Life Years (Sjögren and
Helgesson 2007), which means that the suggestion by Latour and Lépinay
can be explored empirically in this ﬁeld. In this chapter we therefore analyse
the potential of extending the range of valuemeters in markets, to see whether
the presence of such market devices indeed leads to a wider-ranging compos-
ition of values that extends value practices beyond the realm of ﬁnancial
valuation alone.
To do so we turn to an analysis of the introduction of ‘diagnosis-treatment
combinations’ (DTCs) in Dutch health care. DTCs are a funding scheme that
singularizes treatment processes into packaged health-care products consist-
ing of diagnosis and treatment and for which one price is paid to hospitals by
insurance companies. It provides an alternative to activity-based funding,
where hospitals receive payment for each activity they perform. We explore
the introduction of this new funding scheme in order to address three
questions. First, what is the intended result of this Dutch market for hospital
care according to various policy actors and market builders? Second, what
work has to be done by various actors to make markets function? A focus on
the visible and invisible work (Star and Strauss 1999) of making markets,
allows for a symmetrical analysis of how unintended, as well as intended,
effects come about in practice. Such work is often left out of the analysis of
markets by jumping to their effects, which are then quickly classiﬁed as
‘normal’ effects of well-functioning markets on the one hand and ‘market
failures’ as phenomena to be repaired on the other.
Our third and central question is: what values are enacted in the resulting
health-care market practices? This question allows us to explore market
devices as elements in the process of the composition of values, and thereby
empirically assess the value of the composition-through-devices approach,
proposed by some scholars within STS, for the study of value practices that
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forms the theme of this book. The study consisted of longitudinal research on
the consequences of the introduction of DTCs in Dutch health care (cf.
Zuiderent-Jerak (TZJ) 2009).1
Market devices for hospital care
Since the 1970s, public expense in health care has been on the rise and by the
1980s, the introduction of market mechanisms was already being proposed
within the Dutch health-care system as a possible solution to turn the tables
on increasing costs (van Egmond and Zuiderent-Jerak 2010). Though initially
not being met with much enthusiasm, continuous efforts by policymakers to
develop market infrastructures prepared the ground for market mechanism-
based changes in the governance of hospital care (Helderman et al. 2005).
The notion that the health-care consumer should have individual buying or
co-paying power and thereby steer quality (Berg et al. 2006) has been heavily
criticized for being practically unworkable and theoretically ﬂawed (Jost 2007);
Dutch policymakers therefore chose not to put this notion at centre stage
in the construction of the Dutch hospital market. Rather, according to the
2006 Healthcare Insurance Act, the construction of the Dutch market
for hospital care assumed that insurance companies, acting as proxies for
individual citizens, could buy good quality care at a reasonable cost on their
behalf. As health-care insurance companies are not automatically expected to
want only the best for their clients, citizens are positioned as a countervailing
power (Light 2000) by being given the option to choose their insurer. Insur-
ance companies have to accept citizens as their customers and health
insurance is compulsory for all citizens to avoid ‘free riders’ in the system.
As not all citizens have equal health risks, an extensive risk adjustment
instrument compensates insurers for inequalities in health risks in their
populations (cf. van Egmond and Zuiderent-Jerak 2010). A nationally deﬁned
basic package speciﬁes the care that all insurers must provide. It leaves
1 Between 2005 and 2007, TZJ conducted ethnographic research in a large teaching hospital in
the Netherlands on initiatives that were supposed to bring together quality improvement and a
strong position for the hospital in the Dutch market for hospital care. In 2010, TZJ returned to
this hospital for a series of follow-up interviews with a specialist nurse, the innovation manager of
the hospital, a medical specialist who also chairs one of the specialisms in the hospital, and a
division manager. He further conducted interviews with a purchaser for the largest insurer in this
hospital’s catchment area, with the development manager and an economic expert at the Dutch
Healthcare Authority, a regulatory body, and with the expert at the Dutch Association of Insurers
responsible for developing a Diagnosis–treatment combinations purchasing guide for insurance
companies.
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other forms of optional non-basic care (such as dental care, etc.) to be insured
via voluntary insurance schemes.
In this regulatory arrangement, the role of insurance companies is to
negotiate with care providers on the quality and cost of the care they wish to
deliver. Such negotiations would ideally lead to ‘selective contracts’, with
insurance companies no longer reimbursing care at all hospitals, but rather
contracting only those care providers who provide the best quality at the
lowest cost. This is supposed to provide an incentive for other care providers
to raise their bar in terms of quality and efﬁciency to be able to become
preferred provider for insurers. Insurance companies are expected to have
‘buying power’, as they represent large numbers of citizens and thereby many
potential clients for hospitals. They are expected to apply this power to
stimulate quality improvement and cost reductions.
Prior to 2005, DTCs were developed so that the negotiations between
insurers and hospitals could revolve around care trajectories—say, all activities
related to a total hip replacement—that were packaged in one product, instead
of reimbursing separate activities hospitals carry out in the care for a patient—
e.g. the separate payment for diagnostics, anaesthesia, surgery, inpatient days,
etc. carried out when replacing a hip.2 The Dutch Ministry of Health decided
that DTCs would be divided into two groups: an A segment, with pricing ﬁxed
on a national level; and a B segment, with prices that could be freely negotiated
between insurers and hospitals. The A segment mainly comprises complex
treatments such as less frequently occurring oncological care or emergency
care, whereas the B segment contains care that is less complex and occurs
more frequently, such as hernia repair or cataract care. Though both segments
can in principle lead to negotiations between insurers and hospitals (the
A segment on quality and volume, and the B segment also on price), the fact
that prices are ﬁxed for the A segment has as a consequence that this segment
is usually not referred to as a health-care market by policymakers, hospital
managers, and care professionals. In contrast, the B segment, with negotiable
prices, is discussed in market terms. Policy discussions on the development of
health-care markets focus on extending the B segment to make prices nego-
tiable for more types of care. Thereby, marketization policy equates ‘markets’
with ‘money’, which is exactly what Latour and Lépinay (2009) criticized. The
fact that many actors follow the deﬁnition of the market as a ﬁnancial
instrument brings us to our next question: how and why does this market
work?
2 Since January 2012, the Ministry has introduced some changes to this system, by moving from
DTCs to Diagnosis-Treatment Combinations On the road to Transparency (DOTs). Besides pointing to
the elusive quest for clarity, these changes mainly involve a simpliﬁcation of the DTC structure and a
reduction of the available products. These changes do not impact on the analysis in this chapter and
therefore are not discussed in detail.
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How care providers and insurance companies
make markets work
In the wake of the developing market arrangements, the Dutch Ministry of
Health started a large scale improvement programme called ‘Better Faster’
which would ‘prepare the hospital sector for the new care system’ (Ministry of
Health Welfare and Sport 2005). Better Faster supported hospitals in improv-
ing patient safety and logistics through a series of national breakthrough
collaboratives and other quality improvement programmes. Hospitals started
analysing their care processes in terms of waiting time, throughput time,
length of stay, number of interventions in the process, and number of visits
to the outpatient clinic. In effect, the hospitals analysed how their care
processes could be organized differently and how quality improvement
could lead to gains not only in terms of organizational efﬁciency and patient
experience but also in terms of the proﬁts that a hospital made on care
trajectories or, to put it in quality improvement jargon, what the ‘cost of
poor quality’ was. For this, improvement teams in hospitals developed busi-
ness cases that compared current with desired trajectories to calculate the
ﬁnancial implications of their quality improvement efforts.
However, these business cases required hospital ﬁnancial departments to
know the cost of, for example, individual interventions, outpatient clinic visits,
and the cost of staff. This was not the case. For most hospitals it was a huge
task to produce costing data and they tended to prioritize calculating the costs
of interventions in the B segment over calculating costs that were only relevant
to the A segment. Once available and integrated in these business cases, the
costs sparked interesting discussions between hospital management, doctors,
and quality managers. In many cases quality improvement and cost reduction
seemed feasible by reducing length of stay or by omitting redundant inter-
ventions that at times were the result of poor coordination between profes-
sionals (Pronk 2006; Zuiderent-Jerak 2009).
Improving care processes and assessing ﬁnancial consequences were not the
only tasks hospitals started to carry out. They also developed ‘dashboards’ for
internal steering, to ensure that once a care product had been sold at a low
price, it would also be delivered accordingly, rather than falling back to the
previous (more expensive) situation which was no longer reimbursed, and
which would lead to the hospital facing ﬁnancial loss. For colon cancer
patients, overviews of the number of visits between colonoscopy (diagnosis)
and surgery (treatment), for example, were readily available and were con-
trasted with the norm for such care set by the improvement team for this care
trajectory (see Figure 6.1).
Even with all of this being achieved, hospitals still had to face the substantial
challenge of getting care insurers interested in quality improvement. This
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turned out to be particularly hard work with insurers who did not always
display the expected level of interest in quality matters during negotiations. As
the quality manager of the hospital put it: ‘It’s up to us to bring everything to
do with quality to the negotiating table, and they’re hardly interested’. Since
insurers did not seem to have an a priori focus on quality, the hospital went to
some lengths to position quality as a relevant issue, trying to pitch their quality
achievements. At times this led to fairly archetypical forms of commodiﬁca-
tion. The quality manager continues:
We have to put quality on the agenda. They’re not asking for it, so we have to
present it. In a few areas, and these are increasing, we know we have something extra
to offer, a discerning product, so we put on a big song and dance—always spon-
taneous, not very structured—but quite a show really, just to make sure the insurer
notices. Part of the show involves producing brochures on our discerning care
product. We have brochures for our departments of obstetrics, gynaecology and
paediatrics, nice brochures ﬁlled with graphs, protocols and the details needed by
various target groups in the insurance company. We show them off, we say, here,
take a look at this, this is what our care looks like. That’s all part of our repertoire.
Despite producing such sales brochures, it remains hard for a hospital to sell
quality in the terms they would like. In the debate on health-care markets,
negotiations are sometimes more focused on ﬁnancial aspects than on medical
quality. Both health economists and policymakers often explain this phenom-
enon away by pointing to prevailing ‘information asymmetry’: if information
about quality is not readily available to all parties, the negotiations will focus
on the information that is available, and that tends to be of a ﬁnancial nature.
The solution for this problem is generally not seen as a problem of markets as
such, but is scheduled into a promissory future: as long as quality gets deﬁned
in terms of quality indicators, these can be brought into the assessment. The
notion of information asymmetry supposes that once transportable perform-
ance indicators are available, they will be taken into account in quality and
price negotiations. However, in this case the problem seems to be that even
readily available quality information only becomes part of the equation in very
particular instances. And those instances tend to be where cost, again, is a
central factor. As the purchaser of the insurance company put it:
If you want to be a preferred provider, then your price has to be below average.
That doesn’t mean that as soon as someone else goes ten euro cheaper, they
would get moved to pole position . . .We assume that quality and affordable care
can go together. That means that as soon as you [the hospital] do something right
but it turns out to be more expensive, we would be less interested than if it
happened to be less expensive.
So even when valuemeters, in the form of indicators for throughput time
measured in dashboards and presented in brochures are readily available,
quality becomes relevant only when it saves on costs. If quality always came
at a lower cost, this would pose no conﬂict, but in that case health care could
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do with simpler techniques for measuring best quality at lowest cost. As this
was the initial assumption for many players in the hospital care market, the
market in this hospital ironically worked better in terms of negotiating for
quality and price in the early years based on relatively poor information
(Zuiderent-Jerak 2009) than it seems to be working now, after a longer period
of sometimes frustrating experiences, but based on better information on
quality and cost. The dashboards on quality and cost parameters per care
trajectory that were only managerial dreams in 2007 had actually materialized
by 2010, and yet in some cases it proved harder to bring quality and cost
together in annual negotiations.
This problematizes both the notion of information asymmetry and of value-
meters, and brings to the fore the importance of market belief in making
market instruments work. On the other hand it shows the importance of
sustained analysis of how markets develop over time. Market practices change,
which can have dramatic consequences for how capable market practices are
for coming to a composition of values which is not dominated by price.
When an insurer deﬁnes quality in terms of cost reduction, hospitals seem
to have two possible strategies to continue improving care that may come at
a higher cost, both of which the hospital is pursuing: creative bookkeeping
(not necessarily in the usual pejorative sense of the term); and playing the
patient card. Creative bookkeeping has of course become associated with
scandals, greed, and the misappropriation of funds. Leaving such normative
judgements aside, hospitals have imaginative bookkeeping strategies, cre-
atively ensuring that the costs incurred for delivering additional quality are
borne by insurance companies. Such creativity sometimes leads to adding up
certain items in order to then be able to charge a different DTC. As a division
manager explained:
Outpatients with oesophagus carcinoma get a PET-CT scan. If deemed necessary
after this scan assessment, they also get an endo-echo test on the same day.
Because of their illness they are quite frail and so we admit them on a day care
basis, giving them a bed to recover in, in between these two big, heavy diagnostic
tests. Because of our regional specialization and given the relatively long distances
many patients have to travel, day care treatment is all the more important. It’s
how we reduce the number of hospital visits and manage to create a means of
recovering some of our additional costs.
Bookkeeping DTCs so that various interventions get turned into a short
admission, is a strategy that health economists refer to as ‘upcoding’
(Steinbusch et al. 2007), which is deﬁned as ‘the practice of miscoding and
misclassifying patient data to receive higher reimbursements for services
provided’ (Lorence and Richards 2002: 423). What may be seen as a pragmatic
solution within the present deﬁnition of quality insurance companies embrace
is seen by some health economists as a ‘hospital-acquired disease’ (Simborg
1981). One of the main problems with upcoding is that there is no
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countervailing power that prevents creative bookkeeping from turning into
simple money-grabbing. For an efﬁciently organized hospital it may be a way
of making ends meet, but it is easily seen as endangering the public value of
affordable care.
An alternative that does not involve upcoding is to play the patient card. In
the model of the Dutch hospital care market, the countervailing power of
insurance companies are individual patients who are expected to ‘vote with
their feet’ and change insurer if not satisﬁed with the way the ‘third-party’
insurance company is ensuring their interests (Schut 2009: 70). This encour-
ages hospitals to target patients and their representatives more directly so that
insurance companies are willing to broaden their deﬁnition of quality. This is
exactly what the hospital studied here is doing. To frame the importance of
quality improvement that is so hard to sell to insurers directly, this hospital
has also chosen to address citizens and other parties by signing a ‘contract with
society’, which includes announcements on highly speciﬁc care agreements
per diagnosis in local newspapers and in the hospital’s quality journal. As the
quality manager explains:
It started with our anniversary in 2004, 100 years of [this hospital], that was our
ﬁrst contract with society. We used the jubilee year to spend many Saturday
mornings talking with many patient groups in our auditorium and asking general
things like, what do we want from each other? The care guarantees [of what
patients can expect per diagnosis] are actually a speciﬁcation of what started then.
Now our contract with society gets adjusted annually and has become far more
speciﬁc: What do we deliver to our Parkinson’s patients? What can [a patient]
count on? When is something not good enough? And what penalty card can you
hand in where? We’ve got the support of a management system on our side: are
we still delivering what we agreed to deliver?
However, a problem with this strategy is that it assumes that insurers can sell
better quality at a higher cost to individual clients, while in practice they face
reputation problems: insurance companies have a hard time purchasing
quality that comes at a higher price, as it is difﬁcult for them to convince
insured parties that this prices goes into better quality care, rather than into
higher proﬁts. This is however not the only problem that insurers face: it is
also not easy for them to actually negotiate with hospitals on quality care.
A HEALTH-CARE PURCHASING GUIDE AS A VALUATION DEVICE
One of the problems that insurers face when having to negotiate on quality
with hospitals is that they could—in theory—negotiate on a very large number
of DTCs, as initially around 30,000 such products were deﬁned. This would
require insurers to have an enormous and highly qualiﬁed staff with detailed
knowledge of every instance of care delivered at hospitals—a daunting task
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that is obviously unfeasible. So one of their core activities in ensuring they can
at least negotiate on some trajectories is to limit the number of DTCs on which
they negotiate. As the purchaser of a large insurance company put it:
We cannot review all DTCs down to the last digit. So we drew up a list of priorities
that is based mainly on revenue and volume, let’s say a top 20 or a top 15. And we
also looked at what we ﬁnd important, like breast cancer and diabetes. So those
aspects were also taken into account. These actually are also large volumes, so that
was a good match.
But if insurance companies were delegated the task of ensuring public values,
the question becomes: what about the other DTCs? For those combinations
that also allow for negotiation on price (the B segment), the Dutch Association
of Insurers, the sector organization representing the providers of care insurance
in the Netherlands, publishes an annual DTC purchasing guide (Figure 6.2),
subtitled Quality as a compass when purchasing care.
Figure 6.2. Dashboards for steering quality showing the average number of hospital visits
in relation to the norm
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The Dutch Association of Insurers compiles and publishes this commer-
cially available guide for negotiations between health-care insurers and sec-
ondary care providers with various other actors, including scientiﬁc medical
associations, and structures the proﬁles around available clinical practice
guidelines. Furthermore, performance indicators developed on a national
level are directly integrated and the opinions of patient associations on several
diseases are taken into account.
The purchasing guide was developed as an immediate response to the new
role insurers play when negotiating with hospitals on the content and price of
care. This purchasing guide frames to a large extent what negotiations focus
on. It is an interesting market device for several reasons. First, it seems
indispensable in reducing the enormous work of health-care insurance com-
panies to doable proportions. Second, though this framing is crucial for a
pragmatically functioning hospital care market, the idea that public values are
delegated to insurance companies, who act on behalf of their insured, seems in
need of revision. With its hybrid forum of doctors, patients, and guidelines, this
hot potato of composing quality in relation to cost seems to have landed on the
Dutch Association of Insurers’ plate rather than with individual insurers. This
raises questions about the form and place where public values are indeed shaped
and what is taken into this de facto national framing of quality of care. Because
of this, the framing of the guide warrants further scrutiny.
One way the purchasing guide deals with the overwhelming number of
theoretically negotiable DTCs is to cluster them. As the respondent of the
Association of Insurers explained:
Let’s take a simple example: cataract. There are now three DTCs: one in out-
patient clinics, one as day treatment and one with admission. You can say, all
right, you can assign three prices to that, or you can say—and that always has
been our primary aim—all well and good: let’s put them all in one basket and make
a combined proﬁle. So we reduce these three to one. There are three different codes,
from outpatient, day treatment and admission, but as far as we’re concerned, you
can put one price to this [cluster]. That’s one way we made it doable.
Besides clustering, another way of simplifying negotiations on large numbers
of DTCs is to specify which ones can be excluded. The same respondent
explains:
Wherever it says ‘no’ [niet-onderhandelbaar: non-negotiable] we said: ‘we don’t
make a proﬁle for that’. This actually means two things. Either it’s nonsense: this
DTC shouldn’t even be listed, meaning: price equals zero. Or it is so rare: we’re
not going to negotiate, you give your price and I’ll see if I think: Ouch, let go of my
arm’ . . . So that’s how we’ve approached it. We looked at howmany DTCs there are
in the B segment—something like 10,000—and we’ve been able to reduce these to
let’s say 200. Then again, our focus has always been on high volume DTCs.
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In this quest for doability, DTCs are increasingly selected and combined in
clusters. A relatively small number of ‘baskets’ thus covers a large percentage
of delivered care, especially in certain types of treatment such as eye care.
Thereby, the purchasing guide assumes that a smaller number of DTCs can be
used in negotiations, all the while still pursuing quality on a larger scale:
At some point I can start to discuss eye care. Someone who’s good in cataract
procedures, wouldn’t that person be good in glaucoma procedures as well? . . . Once
I know the core points, where I can say, well that’s organized well, then the rest will
follow.
This assumption is highly understandable in the light of the creation of a doable
health-care market, but quality improvement researchers have observed that
improvement to one stream of care is often at the expense of other patient
groups. This phenomenon, generally referred to as ‘carve out’ (Silvester et al.
2004), has been particularly noted in eye care where the dominance of cataract
often leads to well-organized treatment pathways that are completely isolated
from other forms of eye care.
These problems do however not stop this negotiation infrastructure from at
times being highly consequential. As the associations’ respondent told us, the
purchasing guide is not only an instrument for insurers, but also for hospital
directors:
The board of directors at [a large hospital in the western conurbation of the
country] took this guide to their doctors, saying: ‘Well, look here!’ And within a
week admission length was cut by two days . . . [The guide gave the directors]
something on paper that isn’t theirs but has objective credibility, they didn’t make it
up. It’s the professional organizations saying what they think things should look
like on average. So they took the guide to their specialists and said: ‘Looks like
you’re deviating from the norm. You can, but then we’d like to know why.’
Apparently there was no valid reason, so this guide produced results: wonderful!
In this sense the purchasing guide sets a de facto norm, even though it was
supposed to be a ‘mere’ negotiation aid. Apparently, the threat of future
negotiation combined with a standard created partly by doctors themselves
can produce results—and possibly—quality gains without the need for actual
negotiation.
As we have shown in this section, the hospital has had to do much work to
create valuemeters that shape public values in the market for hospital care.
The challenge for insurers seems no less daunting, and the results for the
relation between markets and public values seem equally ambiguous; this
despite the valuemeters the sector organization of health-care insurance com-
panies developed in the form of the purchasing guide. Having analysed some
of the work various actors carry out in the market for hospital care, let us now
return to the question of which values are produced.
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The composition of public values in the Dutch
market for hospital care
One aspect of the health-care market that has come explicitly to the fore is that
all public values, not merely affordability, tend to get framed in the light of
ﬁnancial devices. Quality improves through the market devices we encoun-
tered, but generally only the quality that comes at a lower cost. Interestingly,
all actors, whether based in hospitals, insurance companies, or agencies like
the Dutch Association of Insurers, grant an ontologically privileged status to
the price mechanism to ensure public values. One of the clearest indicators for
this is that for those aspects of care not included in the DTC B segment, there
is no purchasing guide. Insurers indicate that quality is only quality if it
includes efﬁciency gains and hospitals point out that quality not associated
with a ﬁnancial advantage cannot be sold.
As a consequence of this situation it is harder to sell good quality than to
divest expensive care—a policy that respondents referred to as ‘managing
bleeders and feeders’. This shows that, whereas the aim of the market policy
was to get health-care organizations to compete for the favour of the insurance
companies on the basis of differential quality, in fact they were becoming more
similar due to the market devices that were developed to meet this aim.
Negotiations on quality do seem to have started, which most certainly is a
major gain for hospitals, patients, insurers, and policymakers alike, in com-
parison to earlier times where discussions between insurers and hospitals only
focused on volume and money. But according to the respondents, through the
central positioning of price mechanisms, these negotiations shape the deﬁn-
ition of quality as positively related to cost reduction, despite the wide range of
valuemeters being developed by many actors to countervail this deﬁnition of
the public value of quality of care.
Conclusions: Critical composition of value practices
As we hope to have shown, the market practices under study have complex
relations to public values. What ‘the market’ is and what ‘public values’ are, is
never clear in any ﬁxed or static sense. Our approach to studying this process
of the composition of public values through market practices has allowed us to
analyse the work that many actors need to do to produce such effects. It also
opens up the study of markets as ‘political issues’ (Barry and Slater 2002: 287)
as it allows us to analyse how markets and public values shape each other. If
market devices shape public values in speciﬁc ways, rather than merely
implementing predeﬁned values, the development of market practices is a
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highly relevant empirical domain. Government agents as well as market
researchers will want to understand how this occurs, with what consequences,
and possible alternatives to remedy bad value-composition.
We feel there are two reasons why this should not lead to a re-politicization
of the development of market devices through increased democratic control
and debate over their development processes. First, as we indicated in the
introduction, political debates on the role of markets in health care are
generally caught in the question as to whether health care really is or is not
a market, making it highly unlikely that such re-politicization would be
productive. Second, bringing markets back into the political forum implies
that the composition of public values could somehow be brought back under
democratic control through discursive action. We would rather propose to
accept that public values are shaped in practice and that therefore the rela-
tionship between policy aims and consequences can never quite be captured
through the logic of implementation. For this the process is too unpredictable
and the consequences too unforeseen. Such dynamic unpredictability is better
explored through an experimental role for policymakers. They would see
market devices not as an operationalization of policy aims, but as experimental
practices in which the aim is a good composition of public values. Without
such a shift, health economists and policymakers may always have the promise
of a better market future but never a prospect for achieving it (Latour 2010:
486). Abandoning the idea that a market can implement public values is a key
requirement for composition, for how could one ‘assemble anything properly
while not looking at it! . . . It is impossible to compose without attending ﬁrmly
to the task at hand’ (Latour 2010: 487, emphasis in the original). And such
‘attending ﬁrmly’ is precisely undone by the logic of implementation.
Our analysis shows that market devices can shape speciﬁc public values in
rather unexpected ways. Though the policy aim in the Dutch hospital market
was to increase choice for both clients and insurance companies and thereby
provide incentives for quality improvement through diversiﬁcation of hos-
pitals, ironically, DTCs are producing the very opposite result of a national
standard for quality of care. These market devices therefore seem to undo
the very aspects that, according to the policy aims, they were supposed to
strengthen. Market devices have often been regarded as shaping the setting in
line with the policy aims and assumptions under which they are expected to
operate—generally captured under the heading of ‘performative’ market
mechanisms (MacKenzie 2004; MacKenzie et al. 2007). However, the market
devices we studied made the practices within which they were supposed to
operate less favourable to the policy aims—a phenomenon that has been called
‘counterperformativity’ (MacKenzie 2007).
Furthermore, the market devices studied here lead to speciﬁc compositions
of the public value of quality that is shaped predominantly in ﬁnancial terms.
Quality is easily deﬁned as directly related to cost savings, which leads to
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substantial gains in the affordability of care and reduction of length of stay in
most hospitals. This is a substantial improvement, given that each unnecessary
day in a hospital is both a societal cost and a risk for patients. Yet this speciﬁc
deﬁnition of quality sits uncomfortably with notions of quality that do not
involve cost savings. Given the extensive efforts to develop valuemeters for
such non-ﬁnancial deﬁnitions of quality, the fact that quality has come to be
deﬁned in terms of cost-saving is not merely a consequence of a lack of quality
information and/or ‘information asymmetry’.
Even where information on quality is readily available during negotiations,
price seems to dominantly shape what counts as quality. Information may be
available but still not have any consequence if ﬁnancial aspects are so much
easier to calculate and other quality aspects are both more elusive and less
convenient to some actors. This result is not unique to this market arrange-
ment: ﬁnancial aspects were even more conﬁning in times of ﬁxed budgets that
tended to be consumed towards the end of the year and could lead to the
closing down of operating theatres for some surgical procedures until the start
of the new ﬁnancial year. It is hard to imagine a more dominant link between
quality and its deﬁnition by ﬁnancial aspects.
The point therefore is not that that these new market devices have made an
issue of price or money. Nor do we want to pose it as problematic that public
values are shaped in the practice of operationalizing them in market devices:
means always change and translate the aims they are supposed to ensure (Latour
1999b). Interestingly in this study however, we noticed that the redeﬁnition of
public values in terms of price is not in the absence of, but despite the wide
availability of a range of valuemeters that precisely aim at the broader notion of
‘metrology’ that Latour and Lépinay (2009) propose. The strategy of preventing
such narrow deﬁnitions of public values through the development of a wider
range of valuemeters therefore seems not only to neatly match initiatives by
health economists and other actors who have been developing such meters for
decades; it also seems unworkable in practice.
This crucially shifts the focus from the development of valuemeters to a
study of valuemeters at work and points to tentative ways of exploring
experimental grounds for the task of composing rather than implementing
public values.3 Such explorations would need to be pursued not merely
3 In this light, it would e.g. be interesting to experiment with market developments that do not
ascribe a privileged status to ﬁnancial devices and price mechanism, for which experimenters could
draw upon the existing economic literature about non-price competition (Gaynor and Vogt 1999;
Hammer 1999; Pope 1989). Rather than developing more valuemeters that have to compete with the
measurement of price, the DTCs with ﬁxed prices (the DTC A segment) may be precisely one of the
most promising domains for exploring competition on other public values such as quality. Experiences
within the British NHS with the 2006 reform of ﬁxing prices and giving patients the choice of at least
ﬁve hospitals seem promising in this regard (Gaynor et al. 2010).
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, 2/12/2014, SPi
134 ZUIDERENT-JERAK, GRIT, AND VAN DER GRINTEN
Comp. by: C. Vijayakumar Stage : Revises1 ChapterID: 0002221775 Date:2/12/14
Time:18:26:36 Filepath://ppdys1122/BgPr/OUP_CAP/IN/Process/0002221775.3d135
through developing valuemeters that would make actors’ value judgements
‘visible and readable’ (Latour and Lépinay 2009: 16), but also by disarticulating
certain values to allow other values to be more powerfully articulated. Latour’s
deﬁnition of composition, of having to put things together while retaining
their heterogeneity, also implies that, when such heterogeneity is lost through
the dominance of one value deﬁning the others, a somewhat more antagonistic
process of excluding certain aspects—in this case price—may be warranted. If
composition is to substantially change existing practices of market develop-
ment, rather than mirroring a health economic promise of a future with
symmetrical treatment of heterogeneous values once the correct information
is available, scholarly critiques of the workings of existing market arrange-
ments may not be opposed to composition, as Latour proposed, but may
well be dearly needed for the very process of composing public values. When
such critiques are not aimed at debunking ‘the market’ in order to unveil
sociological complexity, but are geared towards differentiating between poor
and better composition of a heterogeneity of public values—in other words, if
critique shifts from being predicated on sociological realism to ﬁnding a ﬁrm
footing in immanence—composition becomes critical composition. Wouldn’t
that be a prospect for social studies of value practices?
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